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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a final decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) and 63-46b-16(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE I. The Tax Commissions finding that the exemption 
granted in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) did not apply was 
reasonable. 
Standard of Review; The standard of review is "abuse of 
discretion" because the Commission was granted express and 
implied discretion by statute. 
ISSUE II. The Tax Commissions assessment on OSI's use of a 
liquid nitrogen spray in its manufacturing process was reasonable 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(1) and Utah Code Admin. P. 
R865-19-29S(1B). 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is "abuse of 
discretion" because the Commission was granted express and 
implied discretion by statute. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Basic tax provisions; 
§ 59-12-103(1)(1), Utah Code Ann., as amended. 
§ 59-12-103/ sales and use tax base - rate: 
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for 
the amount paid or charged for the following: 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, 
or consumed in this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) (Cum. Supp. 1991): 
The following sales and uses are exempt from 
the taxes imposed by this chapter: 
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control 
insects, diseases, and weeds for commercial 
production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, 
seeds, and animal products; 
Section 59-12-118, Utah Code Ann., as amended. 
Section 59-12-118 "[t]he administration of 
this chapter is vested in and shall be 
exercised by the Commission which may 
prescribe forms and rules to conform with 
this chapter for the making of returns and 
for the ascertainment, assessment, and 
collection of the taxes imposed under this 
chapter." 
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-29S(1B) (1991-1992): 
Tangible personal property or services which 
are purchased by a manufacturer or compounder 
which do not become and remain an integral 
part of the article being manufactured or 
compounded are subject to sales or use tax. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission 
assessed use tax deficiency for OSI's use of liquid nitrogen in 
its meat processing plant. The Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax 
Commission") issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Final Decision affirming the Auditing Division's assessment. The 
audit period included calendar years 1988, 1989 and 1990. The 
amount of tax, interest and penalty for the audit period was 
$230,234.65. OSI argued that the purchases fit within the 
exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) as a spray and 
insecticide for production of animal products. OSI now appeals 
the Final Decision of the Tax Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts listed in the Brief of Petitioner 
substantially represents the facts in this case as stipulated 
prior to hearing and subsequent thereto. However, the facts the 
Commission found relevant to its decision and are not contested, 
should be emphasized. 
The Petitioner operates a meat processing plant which 
produces ground beef and pork patties for sales to McDonald's 
Restaurants. The patties are made from bulk meat which is 
supplied to the Petitioner from other sources. (Tax Commission 
Final Decision p. 1.) 
In the process of producing the patties, liquid nitrogen is 
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sprayed onto the patties to flash freeze them to a very low 
temperature. The patties are then packed in containers and 
placed in cold storage to maintain their hard frozen condition 
while awaiting shipment in refrigerated vehicles to McDonald's 
Restaurants. (Tax Commission Final Decision p. 2.) 
The freezing process is used to preserve the uniformity, 
freshness, quality and purity of the patties and also acts as a 
retardant to spoilage. (Tax Commission Final Decision p. 2.) 
During the audit period in question, the Petitioner 
purchased its liquid nitrogen from its vendors and did so without 
paying sales tax on the purchase price. The Petitioner 
maintained that the use of liquid nitrogen constituted a "spray" 
used in the production of animal products and thus was exempt 
from taxation as provided for by Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
OSI relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) as providing 
it with an exemption from the Tax Commission's assessment. 
Contrary to OSI's contentions, this exemption does not apply. 
OSI contends that liquid nitrogen qualifies as an exemption under 
this section which exempt "sprays and insecticides use to control 
insects, diseases, and weeds for commercial production of fruits, 
vegetables, feeds, seeds and animal products." 
The Tax Commission correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-104(20). The exemption statute is to be construed as a 
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comprehensive whole and not piecemeal. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991). When this 
exemption is read as a whole, its clear intent is to exempt 
sprays and insecticides used in agricultural production. 
The Tax Commission assessed OSI for its use of a liquid 
nitrogen spray in processing manufactured meat patties for 
McDonald's restaurants. This assessment was correct pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(1) which taxes "tangible personal 
property stored, used or consumed in this state." During OSI's 
use, the liquid nitrogen spray is entirely consumed. None of the 
spray becomes an ingredient or component of the final product. 
The proper standard of review under the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act is the "abuse of discretion" standard. OSI's use 
of liquid nitrogen spray in its manufacturing process does not 
come within the ambit of the exemption. Even if the "correction 
of error" standard were applied, the Tax Commission should be 
sustained. 
OSI's interpretation of § 59-12-104(20) should not be 
allowed under the well established principle of taxation which 
requires tax exemptions to be strictly construed against the 
taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority. Parsons Asphalt 
Products v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980). 
Under this principle, OSI's broad reading of § 59-12-104(20) 




I. THE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND THAT OSI DOES NOT 
FALL WITHIN THE SALES AND USE TAX EXEMPTION UNDER THE 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 59-12-104(20). 
A. THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER UAPA IS THE 
-ABUSE OF DISCRETION" STANDARD. THUS, THE TAX 
COMMISSION'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS 
EXACT ITS ACTION IS FOUND TO BE UNREASONABLE. 
Discussing the standard of review under UAPA, the Utah 
Supreme Court Stated: 
Under UAPA, this court reviews an agency decision which 
interprets statutory law using the correction of error 
standard found in section 63-46b-16(4)(d), unless the 
legislature has granted the agency discretion in 
interpreting and administering the statute. Agency 
discretion may be either express or implied and, if 
granted, results in review of the agency action for an 
abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). 
Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 
(Utah 1992) (footnotes omitted)1 See King v. Industrial Comm'n, 
No. 920464-CA, (Utah App., March 18, 1993). Thus, if either 
express or implied discretion is found, the proper standard of 
review is § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) Utah Code Ann. which provides: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
lThe Supreme Court has also stated, "[i]n many cases where we 
would summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of its 
expertise, it is also appropriate to grant the agency deference on 
the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained 
in the governing statute." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of 
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). See also 
King v. Industrial Comm'n, No. 920464-CA, (Utah App., March 18, 
1993). 
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(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agenry by statute; . . . . 
The standard of review appellate courts apply under § 63-
46b-16(4)(h)(i) is one of "reasonableness". The Utah Supreme 
Court stated, "[I]n past cases, we have held that an agency has 
abused its discretion when the agency's action, viewed in the 
context of the language and purpose of the governing statute, is 
unreasonable." Morton at p. 587 (footnote omitted). 
In the case at bar, the Commission has been granted both 
express and implied discretion to interpret the relevant 
statutes. Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act provides, "[T]he 
administration of this chapter is vested in and shall be 
exercised by the Commission which may prescribe forms and rules 
to conform with this chapter for the making of returns and for 
the ascertainment, assessment, and collection of the taxes 
imposed under this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that by enacting § 59-12-118 
"[t]he legislature has granted the Commission discretion in 
administration of the tax code generally." Putvin v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 837 P.2d 589 (Utah App. 1992). Recently the Utah 
Court of Appeals reiterated both an explicit and implicit grant 
of discretion by statute. Kino v. Industrial Commission, No. 
920464-CA slip op. at 10 (Utah App. March 18, 1993). The King 
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case is included as Appendix 1 to this brief. 
Should this Court find no explicit grant of discretion, it 
is clear that the Tax Commission has also been granted implied 
discretion to interpret and apply the relevant statutes. First, 
the terms of the exemption statute at issue are broad enough to 
be open to interpretation by the Tax Commission. In Morton this 
Court stated, "we had held that when the operative terms of a 
statute are broad and generalized, these terms bespeak a 
legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to the 
responsible agency." Morton, 581 P.2d at 588 (citation omitted). 
The Tax Commission did not abuse its discretion in applying 
the facts and finding OSI's use of liquid nitrogen was beyond the 
intended limits of the exemption. 
Should this Court determine that deference not be given to 
the Tax Commission's Final Decision, ample evidence exists in the 
record at the formal hearing and in the stipulated facts for this 
Court to affirm the final decision of the Tax Commission on its 
own merits. No error was committed in the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the decision of the Tax Commission. The 
Tax Commission correctly applied the rule of noscitur a. sociis 
from the Morton case (Tax Commission Final Decision p. 4) and 
using that rule when it concluded, "when applying that rule of 
statutory construction to the present case, it becomes clear that 
the word 'sprays' is meant to be a substance which is used in the 
same manner as an insecticide or herbicide which may be applied 
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to agricultural or animal products to prevent or destroy 
diseases. Here, the liquid nitrogen is not an insecticide or 
herbicide and the only reason it would qualify under the 
exemption as proposed by the Petitioner is that it is sprayed 
upon the meat patties." (Tax Commission Final Decision p. 4.) 
The Tax Commission went on to state, "Admittedly, the liquid 
nitrogen, when used to freeze the meat patties, helps to prevent 
and retard the growth of bacterial micro-organisms which lead to 
spoilage. This natural process of spoilage however does not 
constitute a 'disease' as contemplated under this statute. As 
used in the statute, the word 'diseases', implies an external 
force such as infection, that creates an abnormal impairment of a 
plant or animal's normal functions. It does not imply the 
natural decay of agricultural or animal products." (Tax 
Commission Final Decision p. 5.) 
Common sense would limit the application of the exemption to 
the "growing" end of food production, not the "consumption" end. 
Basically, the liquid nitrogen used by the Petitioner freezes the 
processed food as hard as a brick so that it can be stored, 
shipped, and stored again before it is finally grilled for a 
McDonald's customer. Certainly, no error was committed in 
finding this process outside the intentions of the exemption. 
B. THE TAX COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN FINDING OSI'S 
USE OF LIQUID NITROGEN DOES NOT FIT WITH THE 
REASONABLE MEANING OF § 59-12-104(20). 
OSI claims that its use of liquid nitrogen falls within the 
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exemption granted in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) (Supp. 1991) 
which exempts "sprays and insecticides used to control insects, 
diseases, and weeds for commercial production of fruits, 
vegetables, feeds, seeds and animal products." OSI's argument is 
without merit. No weeds or insects are affected by their liquid 
nitrogen. 
As there is no substantive legislative history on this 
specific exemption, one must turn to rules of statutory 
construction to find the proper interpretation of this exemption 
statute.2 A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires 
the words of a statute to be construed as a comprehensive whole 
and not piecemeal. See, e.g., Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing 
Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); and Amax Magnesium Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990). OSI's 
interpretation violates this rule of statutory construction. 
Additionally, the Tax Commission's use tax assessment 
against OSI is consistent with the "well-established principle 
that tax exemption statutes are to be strictly construed against 
the party claiming the exemption and all ambiguities are to be 
resolved in favor of taxation." Morton, 814 P.2d at 591. Even 
2The Legislature established this exemption in 1957. This was 
before the legislative proceedings were recorded which began in 
1959. Therefore, there is no record of legislative intent when 
this exemption for insecticides first went into effect. The only 
other significant singular change made to this exemption was in 
1987 when the sales and use taxes were consolidated into the same 
section. 
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though taxing statutes should generally be construed favorable to 
the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority, the 
reverse is true of exemptions. Statutes which provide for 
exemptions should be strictly construed, and one who so claims 
has the burden of showing his entitlement to the exemption. 
Parson Asphalt Products v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 
398 (Utah 1980); Morton, 814 P.2d at 591. Under a strict 
construction, OSI's interpretation of § 59-12-104(20) cannot 
stand. Only by dissecting and torturing the words contained in 
the exemption statute can the Petitioner logically argue for 
inclusion in the pesticide and insecticide exemption. 
Petitioner's brief goes to great length to define a number 
of terms that show the potentially expansive application of the 
exemption phrase. The problem with this approach is that by so 
misconstruing the terms, the phrase can be extended to its 
logical absurdity resulting in the inclusion of such materials as 
water used for washing fruits, vegetables and other produce, and 
any preservatives which might be applied to food products. 
Common sense application of the statute, with references to weeds 
and insects, and fruits and vegetables, logically confines its 
scope to agricultural production. 
Because every possible factual example cannot be defined by 
statute, it is the administrative agency's responsibility to 
examine the facts of a case to determine if they come within the 
logical limits of the statute. Preservatives retard or terminate 
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the growth of microorganisms which are in themselves diseased or 
which produce toxins that become diseases when ingested. 
Freezing food products retards spoilage and allows their 
transportation over long distances increasing their usefulness 
and commercialization. The Commission was correct in concluding 
that this process for presentation and handling did not come 
within the language of the exemption. 
This Court should reference the final decision by the Tax 
Commission in reference to this argument: 
By reading each of the words set forth in 
subsection 20 and defining them, not within 
the context of which they are used, but 
singularly and standing alone, one might 
arrive at the interpretation the Petitioner 
argues for. To do so however, violates the 
rule of statutory construction set forth by 
the Utah Supreme Court in [Morton]. There, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that the rule 
of noscitur a. sociis, provides that the 
meaning of questionable words and phrases in 
a statute be ascertain by reference to the 
words or phrases associated with them. 
(Tax Commission Final Decision p. 4.) 
A lengthy portion of Petitioner's brief is spent in 
describing what the legislature "could have" or "should have" 
done in regard to drafting the language of the exemption. As 
Petitioner correctly points out, there are no legislative notes 
or explanations relating to the drafting and passage of the 
statutory language to shed light on the limits of the exemption 
(see footnote 2, supra). But the Petitioner argues on one hand 
that microanalysis of each word in the exemption is necessary to 
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promote the inclusion of liquid nitrogen within its meaning 
(Petitioner's brief at pp. 14-17), and on the other hand 
macroanalysis of conjunctive phrases or the exemption as a whole 
should not be applied if it works against the Petitioner's 
interest (Petitioner's brief at p.18). 
Morton involved a taxpayer which had constructed 
manufacturing facilities to produce sodium azide pellets and 
igniter material which were components of the crash protection 
air bag system used in automobiles. The taxpayer argued that its 
expenditures in constructing these facilities were exempt under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (1987) which exempted: 
sales or leases of materials, machinery, 
equipment, and services of any person in 
excess of $500,000 for any tax year used in 
the new construction, expansion, or 
modernization . . . of any mine, mill, 
reduction works, smelter, refinery (except 
oil and gas refineries), synthetic fuel 
processing and upgrading plant, rolling mill, 
coal washing plant, or melting facility . . . 
Id. at 589 (original emphasis). 
The taxpayer in Morton contended that "the sodium azide 
pellets are synthetic fuels and that, therefore, Morton's 
facilities constitute a 'synthetic fuel processing and upgrading 
plant' as that term is used in section § 59-12-104(15)." Id. at 
589. Morton argued, like OSI's argument in its brief, that the 
dictionary definition of the terms "synthetic" and "fuel" when 
combined, was broad enough to include the sodium azide pellets 
within the statutory language of a "synthetic fuel." JEcL at 590. 
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The Morton court found that this would lead to absurd 
results and turned to other rules of statutory construction. The 
court stated: 
One such method of statutory construction is 
the rule of noscitur a, sociis, which provides 
that the meaning of questionable words and 
phrases in a statute be ascertained by 
reference to words or phrases associated with 
them. The terms surrounding "synthetic fuel 
processing and upgrading plant" all relate to 
different aspects of the mining or material 
reclamation operations. This suggests that 
the term "synthetic fuel processing and 
upgrading plant" should be interpreted in 
accordance with the term's relationship to 
the mining industry. 
Id. at 590-91 (footnote omitted).3 
When examining § 59-12-104(20) as a whole, the general 
intent behind the statute is that sprays and insecticides are 
exempt when used in agricultural production. It is only by 
dissecting § 59-12-104(20), in violation of a fundamental rule of 
statutory construction, that OSI circumvents the general intent 
of the statute thus enabling it to claim an exemption. However, 
a common sense approach would not lead one to conclude that § 59-
12-104(20) exempts a liquid nitrogen spray used to freeze meat 
3See also Dole v. United Steel Workers of America, 494 U.S. 
26, 36 (1990) ("The traditional canon of construction noscitur a 
sociis, dictates that 'words grouped in a list should be given 
related meaning.'") (citations omitted); Salt Lake City v. 
International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977) 
("Under the rule of interpretation, noscitur a sociis, which 
teaches that terms should be understood in the light of and take 
character from the associated terms, . . .") 
14 
patties.* 
The rule of noscitur a sociis and the analysis in Morton 
supports the Tax Commission's interpretation of § 59-12-104(20) 
in this case. This statute, when read as a whole and applying 
the statutory construction rule of noscitur a sociis, exempts 
only those sprays and insecticides used in agricultural 
production. 
The Tax Commission relied on its finding that the liquid 
nitrogen, was primarily used for preservation of the product 
during transportation rather than a spray used to "control 
insects, diseases, and weeds." This conclusion is logical in 
light of the many methods used to preserve food products from the 
manufacturer or processor to the marketplace. Therefore, when 
§ 59-12-104(20) is examined as a comprehensive whole, its 
language does not cover OSI's use of a liquid nitrogen spray to 
freeze meat patties. 
II. THE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY ASSESSED OSI ON ITS USE OF 
LIQUID NITROGEN PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-
103(1)(1). 
The Tax Commission's deficiency assessment against OSI was a 
proper calculation of sales or use taxes which OSI owed the Tax 
4
"The object of statutory construction is to give a sensible 
and practical meaning to the statute as a whole in order that it 
may be applied in future cases without difficulty . . . and if a 
literal interpretation leaves a result inconsistent with the 
general statutory intention, such interpretation must give way to 
the general intent. This is particularly true where such a literal 
interpretation would lead to unjust and mischievous consequences." 
Burpulis v. Director of Revenue, 498 A.2d 1082, 1087 (Del. 1985). 
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Commission for the audit period, Utah taxes "tangible personal 
property stored, used or consumed in this state" Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-103(1)(1) (1992). The Tax Commission's Administrative Rule 
also supports the assessment. (Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-
295(IB)(1991-1992)) . OSI purchased and used liquid nitrogen in 
its production of hamburger patties for McDonald's. OSI did not 
pay sales or use tax on any of its purchases or uses of the 
liquid nitrogen in its manufacturing process prior to the Tax 
Commission's use tax assessment. OSI's use of liquid nitrogen in 
producing meat patties falls within the statute and should be 
taxed pursuant to § 59-12-103(1)(1) since the liquid nitrogen is 
used the process, then withdrawn from the process and discarded. 
Both parties agree that the liquid nitrogen is consumed by OSI 
and would be taxable unless it qualifies under the exemption 
outlined in issue I above. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission acted in accordance with its statutory 
authority in applying the exemption to the facts of this case. 
When read as a whole, the exemption clearly is intended to apply 
to insecticides and weed killers used in agricultural production 
and does not logically include the flash-freezing process using 
liquid nitrogen. One with a common sense knowledge of farming 
and ranching can sense the intent of the exemption when 
incorporating, as the legislature did, words like weeds, insects, 
16 
fruits, vegetables, feeds and seeds. The exemption was meant to 
cover substances at the growing end, not the consumption end of 
the food chain. This court should defer to the discretion of the 
Tax Commission, or determine the matter on its own merits, and 
affirm the Tax Commission's Final Decision. 
DATED this 3Q ^ day of March, 1993. 
Assistant Attorney General 
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Mark King seeks reversal of an Order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah denying bin temporary total 
disability compensation for the period of his incarceration at 
the Utah State Prison and for the period after his release until 
corrective surgery was performed. We reverse and remand for the 
calculation and payment of benefits* 
FACTS 
King suffered en on-the-job injury to his wrist on November 
20, 1989, while working for Superior Roofing Company. King 
received temporary total disability benefits from the Utah 
workers' compensation Fund from Noveaber 21, 1989 through May 22, 
1990. The Fund also paid medical expenses* 
King was scheduled for surgery to correct his wrist injury 
on May 30, 1990. However, on May 22, 1990, King was incarcerated 
at tha Utah Stata Prison for a parola violation. Because of his 
incarceration, surgery was postponed. Temporary total disability 
compensation was terminated during the period of Xing'a 
incarceration and for tha period after his release until 
corrective surgery was performed. King was released from prison 
on October 13, 1990. King was admitted for surgery on January 
29, 1991 and surgery was performed en January 30, 1991. 
Temporary total disability compensation resumed on January 29, 
1991 and continued through July 14, 1991, covering the period of 
King'8 surgery and recovery. 
On July 9, 1991 an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied 
King's claim for temporary total diaability benefita during the 
period from May 22, 1990 through January 28, 1991. Tha ALJ 
further ordered that the Workers' Compensation Fund was entitled 
to a credit for all temporary total compensation paid to King 
after Hay 22, 1990 and before January 29, 1991. The ALJ 
determined King's "loss of wages for the claimed period was not 
related to the industrial accident whatsoever, but, rather, was 
solely due to the actions or conduct of the applicant which 
resulted in his being incarcerated." The Industrial Commission 
affirmed tha order of the ALJ. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal, King seeks temporary total disability 
compensation for the period between Kay 22, 1990 and January 28, 
1991, the period of his incarceration and tha period after his 
release until corrective surgery was performed. King contends 
tha Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted and applied the 
workers' compensation statutes in denying him compensation. 
Because the proceedings in this case began after January 1, 
1988, we review them under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA). fifi£ Utah Code Ann. $$ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1989 k Supp. 
1992). Judicial review of agency action under UAPA is controlled 
by Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-16 (1989). Section 4 of that atatute 
enumerates the aituationa under which a court can grant relief.1 
1. That section provides: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a peraon seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or tha 
statute or rule on which the agency 
(continued..*) 
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Becauaa tha controlling precedent from the Utah Supreme 
1. (...continued) 
ection la baaed, is 
unconatitutional on ita face or aa 
applied; 
(b) the agency haa acted beyond the 
juriadiction conferred by any 
etatute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all 
of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency haa erroneously 
interpreted or applied the lav; 
(a) tha agency haa engaged in an 
unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, or haa failed to 
follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency 
action ware illegally conatituted 
aa a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon 
a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
<i) an abuse of the 
discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) eontrary to a rule 
of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the 
agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency 
justifies the 
inconsistency by giving 
facta and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary 
or eapricious. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-16 (1989). 
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Court is less than clear* and bacaust of divergence in recent 
opinions of this court over hov we discern the appropriate 
standard of review under UAFA, we take the opportunity today to 
discuss the issue in depth. Compare Putvin V, Tax CglMfl'T), 837 
P.2d 589 (Utah App. 1992)3 (finding grant of discretion in broad 
statutory language without identifying whether it was explicit or 
implicit) with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Tax Comm'n. 207 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 23, 24 & n.6 (Utah App. 1993)4 (finding no explicit grant of 
discretion because no statutory directive to interpret a tern). 
We feel compelled to take this approach due to the admonitions 
this court recently received from the supreme court in state v. 
Thurman. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993). In that case, which 
resolved a conflict in this court regarding the standard of 
review applicable in certain criminal matters, the supreme court 
noted its 
uneasiness with the persistence of the 
division in the court of appeals on this 
[standard of review] issue. To the extent 
that this disagreement simply represents an 
evolution of two conflicting interpretations 
of the same legal doctrine by different 
panels of judges, its persistence is contrary 
to the doctrine of stare decisis. . . * 
. . . It is one thing to admit that 
differences among judges en a particular 
legal question can exist; it is quite enother 
to sanction variability in the rule of law 
depending solely on which of several judges 
of an appellate court sit on a given case. 
id. at 25. Thus, to eliminate any confusion as to the analytical 
model this court is following to determine the appropriate 
standard of review under UAPA, we engage in a rather laborious 
discussion of the standard of review. 
2. CI. State v. Thurman. 203 Utah Adv. Rep* 18, 24-25 (Utah 
1993} (acknowledging supreme court's failure to clearly 
articulate standards of review). 
3. Opinion by Judge Billings with Judges Jackson and Russon 
concurring. 
4. Opinion by Judge Bench with Judge Carff concurring and Judge 
Russon concurring in the result only. 
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A. Xssuas of Fact 
Under UAFA, the standard we apply when reviawing factual 
findings is clear. Tha only subaaction under which factual 
findings can be challenged is 63-46b-16(4)(g). Under that 
subsection, we will change a factual finding only if it "is not 
supported by substantial evidence whan viewed in light of tha 
vhol* record befora the court.*1 Utah Code Ann* S 63-46b-16(4) (g) 
(1689). &£££!£ 2i«»i v. Tax ceB?r'n. 196 Utah Adv. Hep. 15, 16 
(Utah 1992). "^Substantial evidence is that which a raasonabla 
person "night accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" 
Stewart v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) 
(quoting Marriam v. Beard of ftavi«v. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 
1991) (quoting grace PrilUpq Co- V, Board Of, Pevjiw, "776 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah App. 1989))). To reach our conclusion w« examine 
the entire record available to the court, not simply that which 
supports the findings of the ALJ. J£. Thus, Petitioner 
necessarily has the burden of marshaling "all of the evidence 
supporting tha findings and show[ing] that despite tha supporting 
facts, and in light of tha conflicting or contradictory avidanca, 
the findings are not supported by substantial avidanca." Grace 
Prilling* '?« P.2d at 68. Accord Hales Sand a Gravel Tnc. v. Tax 
comn'n. 842 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 1992). This review is not as 
strict as a de novo review of tha proceedings, nor as lenient as 
a review for "any competent evidence" to support the findings, it 
simply accords deference to the agency where two reasonable, yet 
conflicting, conclusions could have been reached. See Grace 
Drilling. 776 P.2d at 68 t n.7. 
Additionally, tha Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure govern 
how we review agancy actions. &ftl Utah Coda Ann. § 63-46b-
16(2)(b) (1989). Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rulas of Appellate 
Procedure provides: "If the appellant intends to urge on appeal 
that a finding or conclusion is unsupportad by er is contrary to 
the avidance, the appellant shall include in tha record a 
transcript ef all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). Rule 11 requirea eeunsal 
provide the appellate court with all avidanca pertinant to tha 
issues on appeal. £lR panpson v. Richin?. 770 P.2d 998, 1102 
(Utah App.), £i£lx djejliRdf 776 p.2d 916 (Utah 1999). Thus, our 
procedural rulas specifically require a petitioner to provide a 
tranacript of the proceedings if he is going to ehellange fectual 
findings undar subsection €3-46b-16(4)(g). A petitioner Bust 
alao provide a transcript if ha argues a legal conclusion is 
unsupported by the avidence in the case, otherwise we hava no 
basis on which to avaluata the findings and conclusions. 
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B. Issues of General Lav 
The standard ve apply when an agency interprets or applies 
general law such as case law, constitutional law, or non-agency 
specific legislative acts is also clear. Our review in this area 
is guided by section 63-46b-l6(4)(d). As ve did prior to UAPA, 
we review agency interpretations of general lav "under a 
correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's 
decision," Qumar Pipeline Ct>, v- Tm Cww'nr «17 *.2d 316, 318 
(Utah 1991). See flli? Zilfj v, TSX CPFff'n, 19« Utah Adv. Rep. 
IS, 16 (Utah 1992} (holding issues of law are reviewed for 
correctness under S 63-46b-l6(4)(d)); Savage Indus.. Inc. v. Tax 
Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) (finding agency's erroneous 
interpretation of law is grounds for relief under $ 63-46b-
16(4) (d)). in MPrtPn international, iPPt, yf Auditing Pivifipn, 
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), the supreme court articulated the 
reason for the correction of error standard is not simply because 
the court characterizes an issue as one of general law but 
because the agency has no special experience or expertise placing 
it in a better position than the courts to construe the law. ££. 
at 586. 
C. Issues of Agency-Specific Lav 
We are faced with a far more difficult task in deciding the 
amount of deference to grant an agency's interpretation or 
application of agency-specific statutory law. In that instance, 
we grant deference only "when there is a grant of discretion to 
the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly 
made in the statute or implied from the statutory language." Id-
at 589.* if there is a grant of discretion we review the agency 
5. Prior to UAPA ve reviewed agency determinations under three 
distinct categories• While the standards for factual 
determinations and interpretations of general law remain the 
same, it is this intermediate area of scrutiny that has changed. 
Formerly 
agency decisions involving mixed questions of 
lav and fact or the application of specific 
factual situations to the legislative 
enactments under which the agency operates 
were to be given deference by the courts and 
were to be upheld so long as they fell within 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
Savaoe Indus.. Inc. v. Tax Conun'n.. 811 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 
1991) • We spent far less time grappling vith the standard of 
review under this relatively simple analysis. The complexities 
involved in the new analysis seem not/ in the end, to make a 
significant enough difference for the amount of energy ve expend. 
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action under Utah Cod* Ann S «3-4«b-i«(4)(h)(i) (1989). £** 
Chicago Bridoa I Iron Co. v. T»Y eonm'n, 196 Utah Adv. Sap. 18, 
20 (Utah 1992). Whart a grant axists, va vill not disturb tha 
agency's Intarpratation or application of tha law unlass ita 
determination exeseds the bounds of raasonablanass and 
rationality. Morton. 814 P.2d at 586-87, 589, 592; Croii v. 
Board of Review. 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App. 1992). "[AJbsent 
a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in 
reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a 
statutory term." MfirJfcoja, 814 P.2d at 588. See also Hor-riO 
Indue., Inc. v. Board of Review. 817 P.2d 328, 330 (Utah App. 
1991), eert, dgniid, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). In Other words, 
we review agency interpretation or application of agency-specific 
statutes where no grant of discretion exists under Utah Code Ann. 
S 63-46b-16(4) (d). See Bennion v. Crahain RwoureM. Inc.. No. 
910089, slip op. at 2 (Utah March 4, 1993). 
The difficulty arises in determining whether an agency has 
been granted discretion and thus whether our review is governed 
by section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). In Morton. the supreme court 
reviewed the impact of UAPA on the standard of review an 
appellate court should utilize when an agency interprets er 
applies an agency-specific statute. Morton indicates that review 
under section 63-46b-l6(4)(h)(i) represents a "break from prior 
lew." Bsi&fin., 814 P.2d at 588.* It held "an agency's statutory 
6. Appaals under the various subsections of 63-46b-16(4) are 
subject to various standards of review. For example, in Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Tax Commission, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
(Utah 1992), the railroad challenged some determinations of the 
Tax Commission. One challenge was to a rule of the Commission 
under section 63-46b-l6(4)(h)(ii). Citing a pre-UAPA case the 
court held that rules promulgated by the agency and departures 
from those rules will be upheld If they are reasonable and 
rational. 2fl. «t 14. The court engeged in no discussion of 
explicit or implicit granta of discretion. The court also held 
the railroad's challenge to the constitutionality of a sales tax 
under section 63-46b-l6(4)(a) vould be reviewed for correctness. 
Id. at 15. 
Thus, Morton applies only when ve are ascertaining whether 
an appeals is brought under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) or 63-46b-
16(4)(d). See also pucpr Cprpt v, TflX CQWn'n* §32 **2d 1294 
(Utah 1992) (noting review for abuse of agency discretion vas 
under section 63-46b-16(4) (h) (i)),* Andereon v. Public Service 
Contain, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) (noting review of claims that 
agency action vas arbitrary and capricious under section 63-46b-
l6(4)(h)(iv) is for reasonableness)* Because the standard of 
review under UAPA will vary based on the subsection the claim is 
(continued...) 
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sonstruction should be given deference when there ie e grant of 
discretion to the agency concerning the language in question, 
fcither expressly made in the statute or implied from the 
itatutory language." Id. at 589. However, Morton does not 
detail what the term explicit grant of discretion means. In 
worton. the example of an explicit grant of discretion to an 
igsncy relates to the Tax Commission deciding whether a piece of 
•guipment qualifies for an exemption from the sales and use tax. 
Id. at S88 n.40. The statute allows the exemption if the 
aguipment is a "normal operating replacement . . . »• determined 
by tha coimiiesion." Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104(15) (1992) 
(emphasis added). Thus, an explicit grant of discretion can be 
found when a statute specifically authorizes an agency to 
interpret or apply statutory language. 
Morton also discusses when an implicit grant of discretion 
is present. He can find implicit grants of discretion in "broad 
and generalized" statutory language because such language 
indicates a legislative intent to delegate interpretative powers 
to the agency. Morton. 614 P.2d at 588. Articulated somewhat 
differently, if we find there are multiple permissible 
interpretations of statutory language we must defer to the 
agency's policy choice, Id* et S69. However, if we can derive 
the legislative Intent in the statute by "traditional methods of 
statutory construction, [there is no implicit grant of discretion 
and] the agency's interpretation will be granted no deference and 
the statute will be interpreted in accord with its legislative 
intent." Id. at 589. 
In one of its more confusing sections, Morton tells us "to 
the extent that our cases can be read as granting deference to an 
agency's decisions based solely on the agency's expertise," they 
are inconsistent with UAPA's command that ws defer only on the 
basis of a statutory grant of authority. Morton. 814 P.2d at S87 
(emphasis added). The court then immediately responds to this 
statement by recognizing the changes it discusses in standard of 
review "may not have significant effect." Id* We take this to 
mean that consideration of an agency's expertise and experience 
is relevant in determining whether the egency should make the 
necessary policy choice and thus be granted deference by the 
6. (••.continued) 
brought under, we strongly encourage counsel to clearly identify 
under what section review is bsing sought and to make certain 
they identify the appropriate standard of review under that 
section. ££. Bhatia v. Departwnt of employment 8ac. 894 P.2d 
574, 581-82 (Utah App. 1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring) 
(encouraging counsel to present an appropriate statutory 
construction in UAPA cases). 
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raviawing court.7 B£££fin epecifically stataa it should not ba 
raad as holding the vaya of finding granta of diseration which it 
diseuaaes "are tha only method* of determining whether tha 
legislature has grantad tha agancy discretion in daaling with an 
issus." JSaiXsn* 814 P.2d at 589. 
Harlan's diraetiva that va aaak out granta of diacration 
bafora applying tha deferential atandard of review undar 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(i) has lad this court to axpand aignificant judicial 
raaouress on aacartaining tha appropriate atandard of raviaw in 
appaala from executive agancy daciaiona. Two aonavhat diffarant 
approaches have ariaan in this court following Morton. Given the 
•merging nature of the law, this result is not surprising. 
Tha approach this court originally took is exemplified by 
Tastara Ltd. v. Department of Employment Saeuri-fcv. 819 P.2d 361 
7. Thia conclusion that agency expertise and experience remain 
appropriate considerations when assaaaing whether to grant 
deference is supported by Sandere Brine Shrimp v. Tax Commission. 
No. 910106 (Utah Jan. 28, 1993) and Board of Equalisation v. Tax 
Commission. No 910256 (Utah Jan. 20, 1993). In both casea, the 
supreme court citaa a pre-Morjfcojj non-UAPA caae, Chris i, bick'e 
Lumber t Hardware v. Tax Commieeion. 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990), 
for tha proposition that "(wje giva no deference to an 
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute ebsent 
certain circumstancea, none of which exist hsre.M Sanders. slip 
op. at 3; Board of Eguallzatlon. slip op. et 4. The 
circumstancea referenced in Chria t pick'a are thoae instances 
where the agency's expertise should ba deferred to. chrie a 
Pick's. 791 P.2d at 513-14. 
Further, a footnote in Zlaai v. Tax Commiesion. 198 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 15, (Utah 1992), a poet-Kfixfcfin UAPA eass, alao supports 
this conclusion. In that footnote the supreme court rejects 
applying an intermediate standard of review based in part on the 
rationale that "the issues are queations of constitutional law 
and statutory conatruction on which the Commission's experience 
and expertise will be of no real aaaistsnca.** 26* *t 21 n.2. 
The JEifii footnote reliea on silver v. Tax commieelon. S20 P.2d 
912 (Utah 1991), and Sandv City v. Salt Lake County. 627 P.2d 212 
(Utah 1992), to support this proposition. Silver is a pre-UAPA 
case and sandv city did not involve an agency of the state, thus, 
UAPA would not epply even if that ease arose today. 
gandfrs, Board of ggu«li«ation. and ZiuJL ell indicate 
agency experience and expertise are still relevant considsrations 
in deciding whether there is a grant of discrstion in eases 
arising under UAPA. 
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(Utah App. 1991).' In Tasten. the issue was the Department's 
interpretation and application of Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5) 
(Supp. 1989) (current version at i£. S 35-4-22.3 (Supp. 1992)). 
That statute directs the Department to consider twenty factors in 
determining if an individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor, we found the language of the statute directing the 
agency to apply the statute "indicates an explicit grant of 
discretion" to the agency to determine whether an individual is 
an employee or an independent contractor, Tasters. 819 P.2d at 
364. The language the court relied on provided: "unless it is 
shown to the satisfaction of the commission," the "[commission 
determines that the] weight of the evidence supports the finding" 
and "considered [by the commission] if applicable." Id. (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp. 1989)). Thus, the statute 
in which we found an explicit grant of discretion authorised the 
commission to apply specific statutory language. 
Other panels have followed the analysis used in Tasters. 
Recently, in Putvin v. Tax Commission, 837 P.2d 589 (Utah App. 
1992),* the case turned on whether the petitioner met the 
statutory definition of nonresident for Tax Code purposes. We 
held the Tax Commission's determination was entitled to 
deference. In doing so, we recognised a general grant of 
authority to the Tax Commission to administer the statutes under 
which it operates and that the Tax Commission often makes 
determinations of residency status. Ifl. at 590. Thus, it could 
be argued we found an explicit grant of discretion. He also, 
however, recognized factors that would support a conclusion an 
implicit grant of discretion had been given. First, ve 
acknowledged neither the statutory context nor normal statutory 
construction ware helpful in determining what the legislature 
intended. ld_. at 591. Second, we recognized the statutory term 
was subject to several possible interpretations and had been 
defined by detailed administrative regulations. Id.. Thus, 
interpretation of the statute was better left to the policy 
expertise of the Commissi on."1 
8. Opinion by Judge Jackson with Judges Carff and Greenwood 
concurring. 
9. Opinion by Judge Billings with Judges Jackson and RUBson 
concurring. 
10. Judge Bench has expressed a concern that what ve did in 
Putyin was find an explicit grant of discretion to the Tax 
Commission by virtue of Utah Code Ann. 5 59-12-118 (1992). fill 
Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm'n. 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 32 
n.5 (Utah App. 1993). He agree the discretion we found in Putvin 
is better characterized as an implicit grant under MflrjtffiQ. 
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While ve have not always articulated why we have found a 
grant of discretion or whether the discretion should be 
characterised aa explicit or implicit, tha result has been 
consistent with MsxiojQ. In each case the language of the statute 
and the statutory scheme support a finding of at least an 
implicit grant of discretion. For example, in Johnson-Bowles Co. 
v. Department ef Coiwarca-. 829 P.2d 101 (Utah App.)," fifiXfcl 
dinitd, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), we granted deference to the 
agency where its statutory schene provided the executive director 
could penalize a broker "if he finds that" the broker has 
"engaged in diahonest or unethical" practices. 2£. at 114 
(guoting Utah Code Ann. $ €1-1-6(1) (1919)). We held such 
language "bespeaks a legislative intent to delegate the 
interpretation of what constitutes dishonest and unethical 
practices in the securities industry . . . ." Id,. Hence, 
although ve did not articulate it, what we did under Morton was 
find the statutory language "broad and expansive" and capable of 
multiple interpretations thus indicating an implicit grant of 
discretion by the legislature. 
Likewise, in Department ef Air Force v. Sw^der. 824 P.2d 448 
(Utah App. 1991)," we did not articulate the exact stsp under 
the H2i££D analysis where we found the agency had bean granted 
discretion by the legislature. In SwlsJtf, an aircraft mechanic 
had been discharged from employment at Hill Air Force Bese for 
drug use. He applied for unemployment benefits and after a 
hearing by an ALJ was granted them. The Board of Review upheld 
the AU's decision. The Air Force challenged the Board's 
conclusion the defendant was not "'culpable' for tha purposes of 
establiahing a »ju«t cauae' termination*" Id- at 450. We found 
statutory language permitting a denial of benefits if a 
termination was for "»just causa . . . if so found bv the 
commission*" constituted the requisite grant of discretion. I£. 
at 451 (emphasis in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann S 35-4-
5(b)(1) (Supp. 1991)). Under Kprj&n, this was the appropriate 
result because the operative language authorized the Board to 
interpret and apply specific statutory language. As the supreme 
court noted would often be the case, the atandard of review Is 
the same as that w« would have epplied under the prior approech 
where we granted deference based on agency expertise. Morton, 
814 P.2d at 588. S«* also Bhatia v. Department of Emplovmant 
11. Opinion by Judge Russon with Judges Jackson and Orme 
concurring. 
12. Opinion by Judge Orme with Judges Jackson and Russon 
concurring. 
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SUu., 834 P. 2d 574, 577 (Utah App. 1992)" (following fialfltE) i 
Robinson v. Depirtaant of ft»plpvffi>nt See.. 827 P.2d 250, 252 
(Utah App. 1992) '* (finding explicit grant of diacration baaad on 
statutory language authorizing agancy to determine issue of 
"voluntariness" and -good cause"). S&S-&1M2 Valoardaon Houainc. 
Svs. Inc. v. Tax Co»m'n. No. 920644, slip op. at 3-4 (Utah App. 
March 12, 1993) (finding implicit grant of discration in Utah 
Coda Ann. S 59-12-102(13) (1987)). 
Recently, Judge Banch has articulated a slightly different 
view of the appropriate analysis mandated by g&slfin. Under his 
reading, the first question is whether there is an explicit grant 
of discretion to the agency.'* Ferro v. Department of Commerce. 
13. Opinion by Judge Billings with Judge Carff concurring and 
Judge Bench concurring with opinion. 
14. Opinion by Judge Garff with Judges Greenwood and Russon 
concurring. 
15. Creative counsel might read Judge Bench's dissent in Luckau 
v. Board of Revi«y. 840 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 1992) and his 
concurrence in Bhatia as indicating we must look to see if the 
statute is unambiguoua before we look for en explicit grant of 
discretion. fiee. Lufikjau., 840 p.2d at 817 (Bench, P.J., 
dissenting); Bhatia. 834 P.2d at 581 n.4 (Bench, P.J., 
concurring). 
The Luckau dissent cites language from Farro regarding 
implicit grants of discretion in its assertion that ambiguity is 
tha first step. £ee LucJULl, 840 P.2d at 817 (Bench, P.J., 
dissenting). In Ferro. the language cited in Luckau came after 
Judge Bench's discussion of explicit grants of discretion and 
before his discussion of implicit grants of discretion. See 
££!££, 828 P.2d at 510. The fihjiia footnote cites Mor-Flo 
Industries. Inc. v. Board of Bavlav. 817 P.2d 328 (Utah App. 
1991) to support the assertion: "We may not defer to an agency's 
interpretation until we know the legislature itself did not 
render its own discemable statutory interpretation." Bhatia. 
834 P.2d at 581 n.4 (Bench, P.J., concurring). While this 
lenguage could be interpreted es reguiring an assessment of 
ambiguity first, it does not appear to be what was intended. If 
we followed that analysis, we would attempt to interpret the 
statute whether there was a grant of discretion to the agency or 
not. 
Thus, we believe there it agreement that the court's first 
task is to look for an explicit grant of discrstion. If we were 
to Ignore an explicit grant of discretion and apply a plain 
language test first, we would ignore the legislature's intent to 
(continued...) 
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828 P.2d 509, 510 fi n.5 (Utah App. 1992)M (citing Marian, 814 
P.2d at 589). If there ia an explicit grant of discretion tha 
court appllas a dafarantial atandard of raviaw. fiiiaiifi, 834 P. 2d 
at 581 (Band), p.j., concurring). Aa ona of tha Xays to this 
analyst*, Judge Bench haa indieatad vhat ha thinks tha supreme 
court scant whan it spoke of "axplieit grants of discretion." in 
his view, that tarn means tha "legislature Bust diract or 
authorise tha agency to define tha statutory tarm by rule." 
2£.|7 If no axplieit grant axists than tha court determines 
whathar tha statuta la ambiguous. ItXTfi* 828 P.2d at 510. If 
not, tha court "applies tha ttatuta according to its plain 
meaning." Id* I' tha statuta ia ambiguous tha court attempts to 
apply tha traditional rules of statutory construction. Id. If 
it can do so, and divine tha intant of tha legislature, it 
applies a correction of error standard. Id. If traditional 
atatutory construction does not produce a legislative intent the 
court will then assuaa the legislature intended for the agency to 
make a judgment concerning the appropriate policy and find an 
implicit grant of discretion. Id- at 510-11. 
There are two major distinctions between the enalyais Judge 
Bench has recently advocated and that applied in some earlier 
cases. First, opinions applying the earlier analyaie have found 
explicit legislative grants of discretion in statutory language 
which is much broader than simply a legislative directive to 
define a term by rule, second, rather than applying plain 
meaning and other statutory construction methods as independent 
ateps in the analysis, the earlier opinions use statutory 
construction as a tool in deciding whether the statute contains 
an implicit grant of discretion. 
15. (...continued) 
grant the agency discretion.. Therefore, counsel should not read 
Luckau. shatia. and Me>r-rio as requiring this court to assess 
ambiguity prior to assessing whether a grant of discretion 
exists. 
IS. Opinion by Judge Bench with Judge Russon concurring and 
Judge Billings concurring in the result only. 
17. ss« also Chavron U.S.A.. Inc. v. Tax Coma'n. 207 Utah Adv 
Pep. 23, 24 * n.6 (Utah App. 1993) (opinion by Bench, J.; Garff, 
J., concurring; Russon, J., concurring in the result) (finding no 
explicit grant under Judge Bench's definition); Beinorth 
petroleum Corp. v. Tax Coum'n,. 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (Utah 
App. 1993) (Opinion by Bench, J.; Carff and Russon, JJ., 
concurring) (same). 
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we turn now to Utah Suprana Court eaaaa to determine whether 
thay hava applied the analysis articulated by Judge Bench or the 
broader one used in the earlier opinions issued by this court. 
Morton itself provides the answer. In footnote 40, the court 
gives the following example of an explicit grant of discretion by 
the legislature. 
For example, section 59-12-104(16) provides 
for "sales or leasts of machinery and 
equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
operations (excluding normal operating 
replacements . . . as determined bv the 
commi««joni-" (Emphasis added.) 
Hoxten, 814 P.2d at 589 n.40. This illustration does not show a 
specific legislative directive to define a statutory term by rule 
as Judge Bench would require. Rather, it is a grant of authority 
to the commission to interpret or apply statutory language. This 
language constitutes the explicit grant of discretion that 
requires a reviewing court to apply an intermediate standard of 
review to agency ection under the statute. 
Additionally, Morton twice states the question the court is 
reviewing is one of "statutory construction or application, and 
absent a grant of discration, the Commission's decision will be 
reviewed" for correctness. 1£. at 589 « 592 (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is not simply interpretation or definition of statutory 
language we review under section 63-46b-i6(4)(h)(i), but 
application of that language as well. Moreover, Morton discusses 
agency actions in terms of "dealing with statutory terms" and 
"dealing with an issue," not "interpreting" or "defining" 
statutory terms. Sl& id. at 588 & 589. Likewise, nothing in the 
language of section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) supports the limitation 
Judge Bench proposes. Consequently, Morton refutes a cornerstone 
of Judge Bench's analysis, that an explicit grant of discretion 
can only be found in language directing the egency to define a 
statutory term by rule. 
Furthermore, in Union Pacific Railroad Cc. v. Tax 
Commie*ion. 199 Utah Adv. Bap. 13 (Utah 1992), a post Morton 
opinion, the Utah Supreme Court epplies the broader analysis. Zn 
that case the railroad challenged some determinations of the Tax 
Commission. The court, without identifying whether it found an 
explicit or implicit grant of discretion, held the Commission had 
discretion to interpret the statutory terms "repairs" and 
"renovations.N JjJ. at 17. Regardless of whether the supreme 
court found an explicit grant or an implicit grant, it looked for 
a grant of discretion prior to construing the statute on its own, 
as have our earlier opinions. 
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In addition, the court has frequently found implicit grants 
of discretion and has not applied statutory construction as a 
separate step in its analysis. See, e.g.. gJ-TlW Sfirv. yr Tax 
Comro'n. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 24 (Utah 1992) (holding Utah Code 
Ann S 59-15-4(1) (Supp. 1986) (current version at id. S 59-12-
103(1)(a) (1992)) contains implicit grant of discretion); Chicago 
Bridge t Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n. 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (Utah 
1992) (applying reasonableness review to Tax Commission's 
determination individual is a "real property contractor" beceuae 
such determination is based in part on lav and in part on fact). 
As with our earlier opinions, the supreme court uses statutory 
construction as a tool in ascertaining whether an implicit grant 
of discretion exists. See, e.o.. Kucor Corp. v. Tay Comn'n. 832 
P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992) (applying reasonableness review to agency's 
interpretation of statutory language based on implicit grant 
because language subject to multiple interpretations). 
He now articulate the analytical model we have derived from 
Morton for determining if the more deferential standard of 63-
46b-l6(4)(h)(i) is to be utilized in reviewing an agency action. 
This model applies In all UAPA cases dealing with either the 
interpretation or application of agency-specific law by an 
agency. First, we determine whether the legislature explicitly 
granted deference to the agency to interpret or apply statutory 
language at issue. As Judge Bench has rightly noted, we can find 
an explicit grant of deference in specific statutory language 
directing the agency to define a statutory term by regulation. 
Additionally, a statute directing the agency to interpret or 
apply specific statutory language should be interpreted as an 
explicit grant of discretion. If we find such a grant, we review 
under section 63-46b-i6(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. That 
is, ve afford the agency some deference and assess whether its 
action is within the bounds of reasonableness. 
Second, if ve do not find an explicit grant of discretion, 
ve examine the language of the statute and the statutory 
framework for an implicit grant of discretion." If the 
statutory language is broad and expansive or subject to numerous 
interpretations ve vill assume the legislature has chosen to 
defer to the policy making expertise of the agency and ve will 
find an implicit grant of discretion and review the action under 
section €3-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. If, on the 
18. Ve note, as the court did in Morton, the ways ve articulate 
of finding a legislative grant of discretion are not exhaustive. 
In the appropriate circumstances ve could find a grant of 
discretion via an analysis yet unarticulated. See Morton. 814 
P.2d at 589 (noting other methods of finding deference might 
arise). 
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other hand, the language is unambiguous and we can interpret and 
apply the statutory language by the traditional methods of 
statutory construction, utilizing our own expertise to divine the 
legislative intent, ve review the agency action under section 63-
46b-16(4)(d) for correction of error. 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-45 (1988) is the portion of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act at issue here. Without articulating 
the analysis we have set out above, ve have previously held 
"section 35-1-45 does not expressly or impliedly grant discretion 
to the Industrial Commission . . . .« croaa v. Board of Review. 
824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App. 1992). hSSSXA Stokas v. Board of 
Review. 832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah App. 1992). This holding is in 
harmony with the analysis we explain today. 
Section 35-1-45 does not contain a directive to interpret or 
apply a statutory term. Thus, it does not contain an explicit 
grant of discretion. Further, because the language is not broad 
and expansive but is narrow and mandatory and is subject to 
construction by traditional rules of statutory construction, the 
statute does not contain an implicit grant of discretion. We, 
therefore, review the Industrial Commission's action under 
section 35-1-45 under UAPA section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for 
correctness. Accotd, Stokes. 832 P.2d at 58; £l£M&> *24 *•*<* •* 
1204. 
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
On appeal, King claims he has been denied his statutory 
right to temporary total disability compensation. The Industrial 
Commission argues King was appropriately denied benefits because 
the extended period of his disability was due to his 
"incarceration and the unavailability of medical care, 
circumstances over which the defendants had no control." The 
Industrial Commission concedes that workers' compensation 
benefits should not be terminated merely as a result of 
incarceration. Instead, the Commission, in denying benefits, 
focuses on the extension of the period of King's disability as a 
result of his incarceration. 
A. Workers' Compensation Act 
Workers' compensation is a atatutorily-created benefit, ££& 
Utah Code Ann. SS 35-1-1 to -107 (1988 6 Supp. 1992). Section 
35-1-45 is the provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
relevant in the instant ease. It providest 
Each employee . . . who is injured . . . by 
accident arising out of and in the course of 
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hia employment, wherever such Injury 
occurred, if the aceidant was not purpoaaly 
•elf-inflicted, ahall be paid goflmanaation 
for loss sustained on account of tha injury 
or death, and auch amount for medical, nurse, 
and hospital aarvicas and medicines . . . . 
Tha raaponaibility for compeneation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital 
aarvieaa and medicines, and funaral sxpanaaa 
providad undar this chaptar ahall ba on tha 
employer and its insuranca earriar and not on 
tha employee. 
Ifl. S 35-1-45 (1988) (amphatis addad). 
One* avarded, taaporary total workera' coapanaation benafita 
"are to continue *until [tha claimant's] condition has 
itablljzid.'" Booms v. Rapp Constr. Co.. 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 
(Utah 1986) (quoting Entwistla v. Wllkina. 626 P.2d 495, 497 
(Utah 1981)). Medical stabilitation is tha tiaa when »*the 
pariod of haaling haa andad and tha condition of tha claimant 
will not aatarially improve.'* Reddish v. Sentinel Consumer 
£lfidL, 771 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting £££ffi£, 720 
P.2d at 1366). "When a claimant raachaa aadieal stebiliration, 
ha is no longar aligibla for taaporary benafita and his status 
*ust ba reassessed." Griffith v. Industrial comm'n. 754 P.2d 
981, 983 (Utah App. 1988). Medical stabilization la independent 
of the ability of the claimant to return to work. Reddish. 771 
P.2d at 1104. Thus, "temporary disability benefits are properly 
discontinued aa aoon as the point of aedical stabiliiation is 
reached, regardleas of whether the claimant is actually able to 
return to work." Ifl. 
King's injury did not achieve aedical stabilization until 
corrective surgery waa parforaed. During the pariod of his 
incarceration he was not aedically stabilised. Therefore, unless 
an exception is applied, under the Utah workers' coapanaation 
scheme, King qualifies for benefits for tha period of hia 
incarceration and the period after his release until corrective 
surgery wss performed. 
B. Incarcaration 
Whether a claimant who la not aedically stabilised aay ba 
denied taaporary total diaability compensation while incarcerated 
is an iaaue of first impression in Utah. Other juriadiotions are 
split on the Issue of whether one receiving workers' compensation 
benefits loses those benefits upon incarceration. However, many 
courts which have conaidered tha iaaue have concluded disability 
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benefits should be paid to an incarcerated claimant." A review 
of the reasoning articulated by some of the courts awarding 
benefits is helpful in our resolution of this first impression 
issue. 
in re Sp«ra. 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1986), is a particularly 
well-reasoned decision. In fipera. the claimant received 
temporary total disability payments until January 21, 1985, the 
date the district court learned he had been incarcerated. The 
court ordered the suspension of further payments while the 
claimant remained in jail. The district judge reasoned 
incarceration, rather than the work-related injury, was the legal 
intervening cause of his lost wages.10 In reversing the district 
court's suspension of payments, the Wyoming Supreme Court held a 
19, See, c,SL, United Riggers Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, $40 
P.2d 189 (Ariz. App. 1981) (awarding benefits because 
incarceration was not voluntary removal from job market and there 
was no legislation taking away these benefits); Baarden v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 483 P.2d 568 (Ariz. App. 1971) (holding right 
to workers' compensation not forfeited during incarceration if 
sentence less than life because no statute so provides and this 
is an issue which should be determined by the legislature); 
Crawford v. Midwest Steel Co.. 517 So.2d 918 (La. App. 1987) 
(holding claimant entitled to benefits despite incarceration 
because statute does not provide otherwise); DeMars v. Roadway 
Express. Inc.. 298 N.W.2d 645, 647 (Mich. App. 1980) (affirming 
total disability compensation despite felony conviction because 
denial of benefits under such a situation "is not the province of 
the Board or the judicial branch"); Forshee a Lanolav Logging v. 
Peckham. 788 P.2d 487 (Or. App. 1990) (holding claimant entitled 
to temporary total disability during incarceration because he was 
never medically stationary nor released for work during 
incarceration); Last v. MSI Conatr. Co.. 409 S.E.2d 334 (S.C. 
1991) (awarding incarcerated claimant temporary total disability 
benefits); In re Scera. 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1986) (holding under 
contract principles incarcerated claimant should not be denied 
temporary total benefits, which under the statute terminate only 
when the worker recovers and regains his earning power). But see 
State ex rel. Srtnnan v. Barrv. 594 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio App. 1991) 
(holding employee not entitled to compensation during period of 
incarceration); State ex vm\. Ashcraft v. Induatrial Comm'n. 517 
N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1987) (denying temporary total disability 
compensation because incarceration was "voluntary" act removing 
claimant from work force). 
20. Similarly, the ALJ denied Xing benefits on the basis his 
incarceration was an intervening cause. 
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worker's incarceration does not require a suspension of tenporary 
total disability payment•. jfl. at 1158. 
Stressing that workers' compeneation law is based on 
"contract" rather than tort principles, the fifitXA. court held the 
worker's right to benefits arises when he suffers a work-related 
injury. £§£ Ad. at 1156-57. The court explained the Wyoming 
workers' compensation scheme Mis based on e concept of industrial 
insurance," which Beans "it is based on eontrect rather than tort 
principles.*1 I£. at 1156. Under contract principles the worker 
should not be denied benefits unless a provision in the statutory 
contract between the worker, the state, and the employer 
explicitly suspends the benefits. The court explains: 
Instead of suing his employer for negligence 
and having to prove duty, breach, proximate 
cause, and damages, the worker in our state 
must file for worker's compensation benefits 
for which his employer is ultimately liable. 
Essentially, the system provides disability 
insurance coverage for the worker. His right 
to benefits arises when certain conditions 
precedent occur, primarily, when he suffers a 
disabling work-related injury. Under 
contract principles, the worker should not be 
denied his benefits aftsr the contingency 
arises, unless a provision in the statutory 
contract between the worker, on the one hand, 
and the State and employer, on the other, 
explicitly suspends the benefits. 
. . . Benefits under the statute 
terminate only when the worker recovers 
because only then does he regain his earning 
power. Incarceration has no effect upon 
benefits which are in the nature of insurance 
which has beeome payable as a covered loss. 
• • • 
• e e • 
. • . The worker's disability payments 
cannot be character!ted es mere governmental 
largesse that can be eliminated when the 
worker's needs are fulfilled from another 
governnentel source. Rather, the worker's 
statutory right to disability payments is 
akin to a contract right. Kobody would 
argue, in the private insurance context, that 
an insurer could withhold payments due under 
an insurance contract just because the 
insured had a second policy which covered the 
same disability. . . . 
920464-CA 19 
We baliava thia same principla should 
apply to industrial insurance craatad by 
•tetute. Bacauaa thara is no statutory 
axcaption which eliminates banafits vhan a 
worker is jailed, tha banafita ara dua tha 
vorkar svan if his naada ars fulfillad from 
anothar govarmnantal source. Tha stata 
legislature can changa our statuta to suapand 
payments during parioda of incarceration, 
much like a private inaurar might place 
conditions on his coverage. But in the 
absence of legislation, ve decline %h* 
State's invitation to make that policy shift 
pvrgglvtf. 
Id- at 1157-58 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Baarden v. Industrial Commission, 463 P.2d 568 
(Ariz. App. 1971), tha claimant was awarded temporary diaability 
for a compensable Industrial injury and than incarcerated in the 
Arizona state Prison following a felony conviction. The Arizona 
Court of Appeala reversed the denial of benefits end held the 
right to workers' compensation was not forfeited or suspended 
during e period of incarceration. SJSJt id* •* 575. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Baarden court reviewed relevant provisions 
of Arizona'a workers' compensation atatutaa. Arizona's statutes 
simply provided that benefits "ahall be paid." Ifl. at 573. The 
court enumerated proviaions of tha statutes which suspended or 
reduced workers1 compensation under specified circumstances- As 
with Utah's statutes, Arizona's statutes contained no provision 
for the forfeiture or suspension of workers' compensation 
benefits based on incarceration. The court stated "the Arizona 
Legislature has not provided for the forfeiture or suspension of 
compensation and accident benefits during the period of the 
priaon confinement of e claimant serving e sentence less than 
lift." Ifl. The Baarden court concluded: 
No constitutional or statutory provision 
relating directly to workmen's compensation 
has been brought to our ettention which 
declares that a person whose civil rights ere 
suspended . • • thereby forfeits his right to 
compensation • • • • Whether that should be 
the law is a natter of public policy which 
should be determined by the Legislature. 
Jfl. at 573-74. 
Likewise, in Porshea t Lanolev Logging v. Peekham. 7*8 P.2d 
4*7 (Or. App. 1990), the claimant was awarded temporary total 
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disability compensation prior to incarceration. Like King, the 
claimant in Forahaa was neither medically stabilized nor released 
for regular vork during the period of his incarceration. In 
affining the award of benefits, the absence of legislation 
specifically terminating benefits upon incarceration was 
significant to the IftrsJue. court. *Xt is the legislature's 
province to restrict the ability of incarcerated Individuals to 
collect workers' compensation and, in sons situations, it has 
done so. We decline eaployer's suggestion that ve create 
additional exceptions that have no basis in the statute.** Id- at 
468 (citation a footnote omitted). 
Thus, the absence of a provision in the state's workers' 
compensation statutes specifically denying disability benefits to 
claimants during periods of Incarceration is a significant factor 
in the analysis of many courts when awarding benefits to 
incarcerated claimants.21 As with numerous other jurisdictions, 
21. The absence of specific legislation providing for suspension 
of workers' compensation benefits upon a claimant's incarceration 
is a significant factor to courts from other jurisdictions 
awarding benefits to temporarily disabled incarcerated claimants. 
fifil fttlXflfifl» 483 p.2d at 573-74 (deciding terminating temporary 
total benefits was matter of public policy which should be 
determined by legislature); ZfiuhjyB., 788 P.2d at 488 (reasoning 
legislature's province to restrict ability of incarcerated 
individuals to collect worker's compensation); In re soars. 713 
P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1986) (holding determination of when payments 
should be suspended is matter that should be left to 
legislature). 
Likewise, the absence of legislation providing for 
suspension of workers' compensation benefits during incarceration 
is also important in the analyeis of courts which evarded 
benefits to permanently disabled claimants who ware incarcerated. 
£*£ United ftiogare. 640 P.2d at 193 (awarding benefits because 
incarceration was not voluntary removal from job market and there 
was no legislation taking away these benefits); Crawford v. 
Midwaet sttt) eo,. 517 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 1987) (holding 
claimant entitled to benefits despite incarceration because 
statute does not provide otherwise), fin. aJxft DeMara. 298 N.V.2d 
at €47 (affirming total disability compensation despite felony 
conviction because denial of benefits under such a situetion "is 
not the province of the Board or the judicial branch**). But see 
Packard v. Donald Sparry t Bone. 331 K.Y.8.2d 12€, 39 A.D.2d 622 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (holding claimant not entitled to 
compensation during incarceration); White v. industrial cornm'n. 
No. L-92-040, 1992 WL 341158 (Ohio App. Nov. 27, 1992) 
(suspending permanent total disability benefits because 
incarceration amounted to a voluntary abandonment of work). 
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Utah's Workers' Compensation Act has no provision terminating 
benefits because of a claimant's incarceration. 
Omissions in the Workers' Compensation Act are significant 
and the "statute should be applied according to its literal 
wording.- Travlor Bros,, Inc./rrunin-colnon v. Overton. 736 P.2d 
1048, 1052 (Utah App. 19B7). Significantly, as noted in their 
caselaw, several states have enacted legislation which 
specifically terminates workers' compensation benefits after a 
claimant has been incarcerated.* 
Furthermore, the Utah Legislature has chosen to restrict 
workers1 compensation benefits under certein circumstances* For 
example, section 35-1-14 provides for a fifteen percent reduction 
in compensation for an employee's failure to use safety devices, 
failure to obey employer's safety rule, or employee's 
intoxication. £gjt Utah Code Ann. 5 35-1-14 (198S). Similarly, 
section 35-1-45 suspends benefits when the accident was 
"purposely self-inflicted.« ££. $ 35-1-45. Thus, it is clear 
the Utah Legislature knows how to limit workers' compensation 
benefits, and does so when it so desires. 
We therefore hold the absence of a statutory provision 
limiting workers' compensation benefits upon a claimant's 
incarceretion mandates a conclusion that temporary total benefits 
should be awarded to King. Moreover, the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act is based on contract principles and an 
employee's right to benefits arises when he suffers e work-
related injury. Absent an explicit statutory provision, the 
Industrial Commission is not free to reduce statutorily-created 
benefits. "The Industrial commission is not free to legislate' 
in areas apparently overlooked by our lawmakers or to exercise 
power not expressly or impliedly granted to it by the 
legislature, even in the name of fairness.91 qsvans v. Industrial 
£fiLBUBJLQ# 790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Utah, workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive 
remedy against an employer for an industrial injury, a fact which 
further supports an award of benefits to Xing. £&£ Utah Code 
Ann. S 35*1*60 (1968). Under our statutory scheme, King 
relinquished his right to sue his employer for his industrial 
injury in exchange for workers' compensation benefits. King's 
incarceration would not have cost him the right to sue his 
employer under the common law. Absent legislative action, that 
22. See, ftg., Whits v. Industrie! Comm'n. No. L-92-040, 1992 
WL 348158 (Ohio App. Nov. 27, 1992)j Wood v. Beatrice Foods CQx, 
813 P.2d 821 (Colo. App. 1991); Jones v. Department of 
Corrections. 460 N.W.2d 229 (Mich. App. 1990). 
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incarceration should not cost his his right to workers' 
compensation. 
The Industrial Comsiission contends Griffith v. Tndu«trial 
Commiatjgn. 754 P.2d 981 (Utah App. 1988), supports the denial of 
benefits in this case. In Griffith, we affirmed a denial of 
benefits where the claimant's disability was prolonged due to a 
delay in corrective surgery for reasons unrelated to the 
industrial accident. However, the Industrial Commission's 
reliance on Griffith is mispleced. 
In Griffith, the claimant received temporary total 
disability benefits for an industrial injury to his anXle. An 
orthopedic surgeon evaluated his ankle and recommended surgical 
reconstruction. The Commission concluded the healing period had 
ended and the claimant's medical condition had stabilised. An 
internist who evaluated the claimant's hypertension and asthma 
advised that ankle surgery be postponed until the hypertension 
and asthma were treated. The Industrial Commission determined 
the employer was not liable for temporary total disability for 
the period which the claimant's hypertension and asthma had to be 
controlled so surgery could be safely performed. The Commission 
reasoned that surgical repair had to be deleyed because of other 
medical problems, not for further treatment of claimant's ankle. 
In affirming the Commission's denial of temporary total 
disability, we found "that the Commission's conclusion that 
plaintiff's ankle injury had reached medical stability on May 2, 
1985 . . . [was] not arbitrary and capricious because . . . [it 
was] supported by substantial evidence on the record." Id. at 
984. 
Unlike King, in Griffith the claimant's condition had 
reached stabilization, a prerequisite for termination of 
temporary total disability payments, fifie. Booms v. Rapp Constr. 
£&*., 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1986). t£S2lA Greyhound Lines. 
Inc. v. Wallace. 728 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1986); Reddish v. 
Sentinel Consumer Prod.. 771 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Griffith, workers' compensation benefits were properly 
discontinued. Thus, Griffith provides no support for the 
Industrial Commission's argument. 
Counsel for the Industrial Commission also suggests we 
should adopt a rule that as long as circumstances which delay the 
claimant's surgery are beyond the control of the insurer, the 
insurer should not be required to pay temporary total disability 
compensation. Such a rule, however, makes no senss. It would 
permit the insurer to terminate benefits whenever they deem the 
claimant's surgery to be sufficiently "delayed," resulting in 
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subjective and arbitrary determinations." Would tha Industrial 
Commission terminate benefits if King's surgery was delayed only 
eight days instead of eight months? Indeed, at oral argument 
counsel for tha Industrial Commission indicated that if King's 
disability had been prolongad for a shortar pariod tha Commission 
would not have challenged the payment of disability benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Utah's Workers' Compensation atatutea do not have 
specific language limiting benefits for incarcerated recipients 
of temporary total disability payments, such benefits must be 
paid until the claimant's medical condition has stabilized. The 
termination of benefits is a policy matter which must be 
addreased by the Utah Legislature, not by thie court or by the 
Industrial Commission. Accordingly, we affirm tha trial court's 
ruling and remand this matter for determination of benefits. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pain* 1» T* Greenwood/ Judge 
RUSSON, Associate presiding Judge (concurring in result): 
I concur in the result. We have previously set forth the 
proper standard of review for appeals from the Industrial 
commission's denial of compensation under Utah Code Ann* $ 35-1-
45 (19S8) in Cron v. Baard of Review. 824 P.2d 1202, 1203-04 
23. For example, under such a rule, an insurer could terminate a 
claimant's temporary total disability compensation if only one 
surgeon had the skill to perform corrective surgery but was 
unable to schedule surgery for three months or vas unavailable 
because he vas called to active service as a member of the 
military reserves. 
920464-CA 24 
(Utah App. 1992). At tha tint of that decision, tha proper post-
UAPA standard of review for appeals under aaction 35-1-45 was an 
iaaue of first impression in Utah. In £££!&, ve determined that 
section 35-1-45 contained no expresa or implied grant of 
diacretion to the Industrial Commission. Ifl. at 1204. That 
decision stands unchallenged as the correct lav on tha very point 
raiaed in thia case, and tha majority expressly acknowledges this 
in its opinion. Thus, in light of Cross. and tha doctrine of 
stare daciais aa enunciated in fltgf v. Thurman. 203 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1993), I find the Majority'* protracted 
examination of the appropriate standard of review in thia ease 
unwarranted. 
o 
Leonard H. Russon, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
920464-CA 25 
